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Can the legal services market become more competitive?

How Lawyers
Compete
B Y M ICHAEL A BRAMOWICZ
George Washington University

L

ester brickman’s article (p. 30)

establishes that the market for contingent fee lawyers is unusual, perhaps even
bizarre. Indeed, the market seems so
unlike other markets for goods and services that readers may think Brickman
adventurous for even using the word
“market.” Just as law-and-economics scholars can use
phrases like “marriage market” to signal that putatively
nonmarket behavior may reflect economic logic, so too
does Brickman’s use of the word emphasize that we cannot
evaluate contingency fees merely by considering questions
of ethics.
More than that, Brickman’s invocation of the word “market” suggests that we might be able to increase welfare by
making contingency fees more like other markets. His analysis suggests that more efficient markets are attainable, at least
in theory. By removing legal impediments to the solicitation
of clients, by unleashing the capital markets to finance legal
claims, and by allowing intermediaries to match client and
counsel, we could produce competition. Lawyers would have
the incentive to undercut other lawyers’ pricing and the takeit-or-take-it-from-someone-else nature of the contingency
fee would be eliminated.
Brickman has convinced me that there is little competition in contingency fee markets, and that such markets could
be much more competitive. But I am not sure there is as little competition as he thinks, or that the changes in legal
regimes he proposes would be sufficient to make the markets more competitive.
H O W L AW Y E R S C O M P E T E

At the center of his case is the fact that contingency fees are genMichael Abramowicz is an associate professor of law at George Washington University
Law School. He can be contacted by e-mail at abramowicz@law.gwu.edu.
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erally uniform, with rare deviations from the standard in any
particular jurisdiction. Brickman recognizes two mutually
exclusive explanations for that uniformity: Either there is no
price competition or the market is so efficient that it has equilibrated at a particular price. Brickman, as he explains in his article, accepts the former explanation.
There is at least one reason in addition to Brickman’s to
prefer the former explanation to the latter. Even efficient markets that tend to have price uniformity, such as the market
for wheat, do not have price constancy over time. Not only
are contingency fees uniform at any given time, but they also
tend to be uniform from month to month, even year to year.
In part, this may be because legal fees are unaffected by factors like the weather. There exist, however, enough demand
shocks to legal fee markets, such as the emergence of new
tort litigation opportunities, that more volatility would be
expected in a competitive market.
The absence of price competition, however, does not
mean that there is no competition at all. Lawyers can compete on quality. Brickman is appropriately skeptical of the
possibility that consumers of legal services will be able to
make relevant quality distinctions. Indeed, even someone as
knowledgeable as Brickman, one of the nation’s foremost
experts on provision of legal services, might find it challenging to find an appropriate lawyer in a garden-variety tort
case. The task would be finding the lawyer who has achieved
the highest settlements or judgments, controlling for the
quality of cases the lawyer has handled. Data are not easily
available, and the heterogeneity of legal claims would make
statistical analysis difficult.
But Brickman would not be hopeless. He might do what
I would do: Contact a friend familiar with lawyers in a particular jurisdiction and ask for a recommendation. My friend
would size up my claim and identify a lawyer who might be
suitable for it. Of course, Brickman and I are better connected
than the average tort claimant. The six-degrees-of-separation
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principle, however, suggests that few people will be far
removed from someone who can make a reasonable suggestion. Information in such markets will be muddy and
some clients will have the misfortune to end up hiring duds,
but the matching process will not be entirely random.
If price is effectively fixed, it might seem that everyone
would want the best lawyer, and some will simply be luckier or better connected than others. But this objection misses the primary means by which lawyers compete for quality: by turning down cases that seem less profitable than
alternative opportunities. The higher the expected profit for
whatever lawyer takes the claim, the better the lawyer that a
client will be able to obtain.
Clients will have only limited means of distinguishing
similar lawyers. But everyone knows the difference between
the luxe interiors of the offices of the high-end plaintiffs’ bar
and the storefront offices of lawyers who may have barely
passed the bar exam. And the best plaintiffs’ lawyers seem
to find ways of attracting many of the most profitable clients,
even within the restrictions imposed by the bar.
The difference in quality among lawyers suggests that in
the end there is price competition, at least indirectly. The
price that lawyers quote is a percentage, and typically that
price will work out to a greater absolute amount with higher-quality counsel than with other lawyers. Of course, with
constant percentages, a client should always be happy to pay
the highest price available, for the best lawyer will produce
the best return. So clients seek the best lawyers they can,
lawyers take the best clients they can, and the market at least
approximately achieves allocative efficiency.
Just as airline deregulation proved that most customers
would accept lower service if it meant lower prices, some
clients might benefit from paying a lower fee even if that
meant a lower-quality lawyer. Presumably, there are some
claims for which lawyer quality would make only a small
difference in the eventual payout, and other claims for
which lawyer quality would make a substantial difference.
In an efficient market for lawyer services, clients would
spend less on the claims in which lawyer performance mattered little.
It may be difficult, however, to identify the claims for
which lawyer quality is most important. Even a client with
a claim screaming out res ipsa loquitur might be ill advised to
shop around for a cheaper lawyer if we lived in a world in
which price shopping were possible. Suppose it were possible to obtain for such a profitable claim a lower quality
lawyer who charged 23 percent rather than 33 percent. Even
on a slam-dunk case, the skills of the higher-priced lawyer
might well produce more than a 10 percent return. Just by
virtue of reputation, a higher-priced lawyer might have a
more credible threat to take a case to trial or to win a large
judgment, accordingly pushing up the case’s settlement
value. Even experts might be ill positioned to advise clients
about how to balance price/quality tradeoffs.
There is a more fundamental reason that clients might be
ill-advised to price shop, and Brickman identifies it directly: agency costs. The higher the contingency fee that a lawyer

receives, the harder that lawyer is likely to negotiate. Because
lawyers receive only a portion of the recovery, they may
have an incentive to work less as the contingency fee moves
lower. Brickman may be right that lawyers will not work
equally on all cases, but a higher contingency fee surely
induces greater attorney effort, all else being equal. High
contingency fees amount to an efficiency wage by which
clients ensure greater attorney effort. Maybe we do not have
lower contingency fees because virtually all clients want to
motivate their lawyers.
The market thus may be more competitive than Brickman
thinks, but a truly efficient market would not be nearly so
crude. An efficient market might even have larger contingency fees, but only for recoveries over and above the
amount that a plaintiff could obtain from an immediate settlement. Such a fee arrangement would provide attorneys
incentives to negotiate at the margin, without providing
windfalls when cases happened to fall into their laps. Even
this mechanism has limitations; if investigation results in a
determination that the claim will not be worth the minimum, the attorney might try to dump it without caring
about the plaintiff’s return. But more sophisticated measures
surely could come closer to aligning the incentives of plaintiffs and their attorneys.
HOW TO CHOOSE?

How could we achieve a market that might encourage such
arrangements? I am skeptical of Brickman’s solutions. As I
discuss in a forthcoming article in the Yale Law Journal, markets for legal claims are particularly likely to be beset by
adverse selection, so even if it is entirely legal to sell claims,
robust markets might not emerge.
Brokerage services might be a more promising antidote,
but here too there are limitations. Brickman believes that
allowing lawyers to pay brokerage services would improve
market efficiency. Perhaps. If collusive behavior explains the
uniformity of contingency fees, then provision of discounts
might provide a loophole facilitating price competition. But
such payments would only provide brokerage services an
incentive to match clients with the cheapest lawyers, not
those who would provide the best return.
Perhaps the most promising solution would be one that
combines the sale of legal claims with a brokerage service.
In particular, brokerage services might themselves charge
contingency fees, perhaps 1 or 2 percent, based on the plaintiff’s net return from a lawsuit. The brokerage service would
then have an incentive to identify the lawyer with the best
price-quality combination for a particular lawsuit and to
accumulate information on which arrangements work best.
This solution may only remove the problem to a higher
level of abstraction: How do plaintiffs choose among different brokerage services offering different contingency fees?
Maybe brokerage services choosing brokerage services is the
answer, and so on to infinite regress. The problem anyway
would be a smaller one, and the market more efficient, to the
benefit of plaintiffs. Whether benefiting plaintiffs is in the
interest of society at large is a question for another day. R
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